#Microeconomics – Working papers (#RePEc, 17/04/2014)

working_papers1

Source: RePEc – EconPapers

Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest also the Best?
Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti 
Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews
Keywords: Consideration sets, bounded rationality, stochastic choice
JEL-code: D01
Created/Revised: 2014-04-08Downloads

On luxury and equilibrium
A. Mantovi 
Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy)
Keywords: Edgeworth Box; General Equilibrium; Luxury; Necessity; Comparative Statics; Pareto Set
JEL-code: D50 D51 D58
Created/Revised: 2014Downloads

Rumors and Social Networks
Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange and Rachel Kranton 
HAL
Keywords: Bayesian updating ; Rumors ; Misinformation ; Social networks
Created/Revised: 2014-03Downloads

Deliberation, Leadership and Information Aggregation
Javier Rivas and Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Cie…
Keywords: Committees; Information Aggregation; Leadership; Voting.
JEL-code: D71 D72 D82
Created/Revised: 2013-11Downloads

Targeted vs. collective information sharing in networks
Alexey Kushnir and Alexandru Nichifor 
Department of Economics – University of Zurich
Keywords: Networks, network formation, unilateral connections, bilateral connections, targeted information sha…
JEL-code: D47 D85 C72 C62
Created/Revised: 2014-04Downloads

Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility
Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli 
University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Econo…
Keywords: costly disclosure of information; matching markets; non-transferable utility; partial unraveling; po…
JEL-code: C78 D82 L15
Created/Revised: 2014-03Downloads

Online Concealed Correlation and Bounded Rationality
Gilad Bavly and Abraham Neyman 
The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew Un…
Created/Revised: 2014-02Downloads

Advances in Auctions
Todd R. Kaplan and Shmuel Zamir 
The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew Un…
Created/Revised: 2014-03Downloads

Communicating Judicial Retirement
Alvaro Eduardo Bustos and Tonja Jacobi 
Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Cató…
JEL-code: K10 K30 K40
Created/Revised: 2014Downloads

10 Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
Messan Agbaglah 
Departement d’Economique de la Faculte d’administr…
Keywords: Overlapping coalitions, Bargaining, Network formation, Coalition formation, Game in cover function f…
JEL-code: C72 C78 D62 D85
Created/Revised: 2014-03Downloads

11 Transaction-Specific Investments and Organizational Choice: A Coase-to-Coase Theory
Thomas Miceli 
University of Connecticut, Department of Economics
Keywords: Asset specificity, contracts, firms, holdup problem, market exchange
JEL-code: D23 K12 L14 L22
Created/Revised: 2014-03Downloads

12 On the core and bargaining set of a veto game
Eric Bahel 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universit…
Keywords: TU game, veto power, core, objection, bargaining set.
Created/Revised: 2014Downloads

13 Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets
Benjamin R. Lester, Ludo Visschers and Ronald P. Wolthoff 
University of Toronto, Department of Economics
Keywords: search frictions, matching function, meeting technology, competing mechanisms
JEL-code: C78 D44 D83
Created/Revised: 2014-04-02Downloads

14 Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems
Bettina Klaus and Jonathan Newton 
Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP
Keywords: Assignment problem; (core) stability; decentralization; stochastic stability
JEL-code: C71 C78 D63
Created/Revised: 2014-04Downloads

15 Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection
Ian Jewitt, Clare Leaver and Heski Bar-Isaac 
University of Oxford, Department of Economics
Keywords: asymmetric information, adverse selection, information structures, information acquisition, informat…
JEL-code: D82 J30
Created/Revised: 2014-01-24Downloads

16 The Housing Problem and Revealed Preference Theory: Duality and an application
Ivar Ekeland and Alfred Galichon 
Sciences Po Departement of Economics
Keywords: Afriat’s theorem; Indivisible allocations; Optimal assignment; Revealed preferences
JEL-code: D11 C60 C78
Created/Revised: 2013-11Downloads

17 Optimal Project Selection Mechanisms
Talia Bar and Sidartha Gordon 
Sciences Po
Keywords: adverse selection, information acquisition, mechanism design, project selection, limited liability, …
JEL-code: D82 O32
Created/Revised: 2013-07Downloads

18 Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games
Sidartha Gordon and Ying Chen 
Sciences Po
Keywords: sender-receiver games, information transmission, nestedness, inter- mediary, delegation, informed pr…
Created/Revised: 2014-04Downloads

Laisser un commentaire

Entrez vos coordonnées ci-dessous ou cliquez sur une icône pour vous connecter:

Logo WordPress.com

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte WordPress.com. Déconnexion / Changer )

Image Twitter

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte Twitter. Déconnexion / Changer )

Photo Facebook

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte Facebook. Déconnexion / Changer )

Photo Google+

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte Google+. Déconnexion / Changer )

Connexion à %s