Microéconomie: working papers (RePEc, 19/05/2012)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  1. Switching Costs and Equilibrium Prices

Date:

2012

By:

Luis Cabral

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:12-04&r=mic
  1. Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items

Date:

2012-04-18

By:

Sergiu Hart
Noam Nisan

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp606&r=mic
 
  1. Sand in the Wheels: A Dynamic Global-Game Approach

Date:

2012-04

By:

Laurent Mathevet
Jakub Steiner

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp459&r=mic
 

Keywords:

coordination; dynamic global game; frictions; Tobin tax;

JEL:

C72
  1. Multidimensional Screening in a Monopolistic Insurance Market

Date:

2012-02

By:

Pau Olivella
Fred Schroyen

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:619&r=mic
 

Keywords:

insurance markets, asymmetric information, screening, gender discrimination, positive correlation test

JEL:

D82
  1. (Un)Informed Charitable Giving

Date:

2011

By:

Silvana Krasteva
Huseyin Yildirim

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:duk:dukeec:11-26&r=mic
 

Keywords:

charitable giving, search cost, value of information, crowding-out, warm-glow

JEL:

H00
  1. Coordination structures

Date:

2012-04

By:

Alfonso Rosa García (Universidad de Murcia)
Hubert Janos Kiss (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2012-12&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Social networks, coordination failures, multiple equilibria, revolts, bank runs.

JEL:

C72
  1. A Detail-Free Mediator

Date:

2012-05

By:

Vida, Péter
Azacis, Helmuts (Cardiff Business School)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2012/10&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Correlated equilibrium; detail-free mechanism; mediated pre-play communication

JEL:

C72
  1. Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction

Date:

2012-05

By:

Azacis, Helmuts (Cardiff Business School)
Vida, Péter

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2012/11&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Bidder-optimal signal structure; Collusion; (Bayes) correlated equilibrium; First price auction; Public and private signals

JEL:

D44
  1. Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game

Date:

2012-04

By:

Chirantan Ganguly
Indrajit Ray

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bir:birmec:05-08rrr&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Cheap Talk, Mediated Equilibrium

JEL:

C72
  1. The value of useless information

Date:

2012-04

By:

Larbi Alaoui

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:625&r=mic
 

Keywords:

value of information, uncertainty, recursive utility, doubt, unobserved outcomes, unresolved lotteries

JEL:

D03
  1. Stochastic signaling: information substitutes and complements

Date:

2012-05

By:

Tom TRUYTS

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces12.04&r=mic
 
  1. Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning

Date:

2012-05-06

By:

Berardi, Michele

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:38651&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Learning; heterogeneity; interaction; coordination

JEL:

D83
  1. Deludedly Agreeing to Agree

Date:

2012-04

By:

Ziv Hellman

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp605&r=mic
 
  1. Countable Spaces and Common Priors

Date:

2012-04

By:

Ziv Hellman

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp604&r=mic
 
  1. Agree or Convince

Date:

2012-05-07

By:

Ozkaya, Ata (Galatasaray University Economic Research Center)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:giamwp:2012_003&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Communication; consensus; information; agreeing to disagree

JEL:

C62
  1. Probabilistic Risk Attitudes and Local Risk Aversion: a Paradox

Date:

2012-05

By:

Vjollca Sadiraj

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exc:wpaper:2012-07&r=mic
 

Keywords:

risk aversion, probability transformation, calibration

JEL:

D81
  1. Quotient Spaces of Boundedly Rational Types

Date:

2011-09

By:

Davide Cianciaruso
Fabrizio Germano

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:582&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Incomplete-information games, high-order reasoning, type space, quotient space, hierarchies of beliefs, bounded rationality

JEL:

C72
  1. Choice By Sequential Procedures

Date:

2012-03

By:

Jose Apesteguia
Miguel Angel Ballester

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:615&r=mic
 

Keywords:

individual rationality, bounded rationality, behavioral economics

JEL:

D01
  1. A generalized unification theorem for choice theoretic foundations: Avoiding the necessity of pairs and triplets

Date:

2012

By:

He, Junnan

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201223&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Revealed preference theory,rationality,preference,choice functions

JEL:

B00
  1. A Cantor Set of Games with No Shift-Homogeneous Equilibrium Selection

Date:

2012-04

By:

Yehuda (John) Levy

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp607&r=mic
 
  1. A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games

Date:

2012-05-07

By:

Rene van den Brink (VU University Amsterdam)
Gerard van der Laan (VU University Amsterdam)
Nigel Moes (VU University Amsterdam)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120050&r=mic
 

Keywords:

implementation; cycle-free graph game; tree game; hierarchical outcome; average tree solution; weighted hierarchical outcome

JEL:

C71
  1. Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient?

Date:

2011-12

By:

Salvador Barberà
Dolors Berga
Bernardo Moreno

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:598&r=mic
 

Keywords:

strategy-proofness, reshuffling invariance, monotonicity, intertwined domains

JEL:

D71
  1. A Measure of Rationality and Welfare

Date:

2011-09

By:

Jose Apesteguia
Miguel A. Ballester

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:573&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Rationality; Individual Welfare; Revealed Preference

JEL:

D01

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