Game Theory: working papers (RePEc, 26/04/2012)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  1. Effects of exclusion on social preferences

Date:

2011-12

By:

Sven Fischer (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_34&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Exclusion, bargaining, ultimatum game, social preferences, experiment

JEL:

C91
  1. On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games

Date:

2012-04-13

By:

Johannes Horner
Satoru Takahashi
Nicolas Vieille

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000412&r=gth
  1. The Nash Bargaining Solution and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons

Date:

2012-02-06

By:

Rachmilevitch, Shiran (Department of Economics, University of Haifa)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201201&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Bargaining; interpersonal utility comparisons; Nash solution

JEL:

D63
  1. River Sharing and Water Trade

Date:

2012-03

By:

Erik Ansink (Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), VU University Amsterdam)
Michael Gengenbach (Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University)
Hans-Peter Weikard (Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.17&r=gth
 

Keywords:

River Sharing, Water Trade, Market Emergence, Property Rights, Coalition Stability

JEL:

C72
  1. Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers

Date:

2012-04-13

By:

Sebastian Kranz

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000423&r=gth
  1. Core Equivalences for Equilibria Supported by Non-linear Prices

Date:

2012-04-11

By:

Achille Basile (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF)
Maria Gabriella Graziano (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:309&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Non-linear supporting prices, ordered vector spaces, personalized equilibrium, rational allocation, Edgeworth equilibrium, Aubin core, robustly efficient allocation

JEL:

C62
  1. All-Pay Auctions vs. Lotteries as Provisional Fixed-Prize Fundraising Mechanisms

Date:

2011-11

By:

John Duffy

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:448&r=gth
 

JEL:

C72
  1. Cooperation in Large Societies

Date:

2012-03-26

By:

Francesc Dilmé (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:12-011&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Cooperation, Many Agents, Repeated Game, Unilateral Help

JEL:

D82
  1. Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results

Date:

2012-04-01

By:

Landeo, Claudia (University of Alberta, Department of Economics)
Spier, Kathryn (Harvard Law School)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2012_010&r=gth
 

Keywords:

exclusive dealing; market foreclosure

JEL:

C72
  1. Harm on an Innocent Outsider as a Lubricant of Cooperation – An Experiment

Date:

2012-01

By:

Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
Lilia Zhurakhovska (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_02&r=gth
 

Keywords:

externality, prisoner’s dilemma, Modified Dictator Game, Beliefs

JEL:

C72
  1. A Portfolio of Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence on Choice Bracketing in a Mini-Trust Game

Date:

2012-03

By:

Jieyao Ding (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_06&r=gth
 

Keywords:

meta-study, self-control, general theory of crime

JEL:

K42
  1. Assuring Adequate Deterrence in Tort: A Public Good Experiment

Date:

2012-04

By:

Theodore Eisenberg (Cornell University, Cornell Law School)
Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_07&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Deterrence, Public Good Experiment, Class actions, Tort, Damages, Punitive damages

JEL:

K13
  1. A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems

Date:

2012

By:

Jiménez Gómez, José Manuel
Marco Gil, M. Carmen

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/182719&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Fallida, 33 – Economia,
  1. Explicit versus Implicit Contracts for Dividing the Benefits of Cooperation

Date:

2012-04

By:

Marco Casari
Timothy N. Cason

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pur:prukra:1270&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Experiments; laboratory; social preferences; inequity aversion; reciprocity; trust.

JEL:

C70
  1. Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Damage Caps under Self-Serving Bias

Date:

2012-04-12

By:

Landeo, Claudia (University of Alberta, Department of Economics)
Nikitin, Maxim (International College of Economics and Finance)
Izmalkov, Sergei (New Economics School)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2012_009&r=gth
 

Keywords:

settlement; litigation; incentives for care; caps on non-economic damages; self-serving bias; asymmetric information; apparent opponents; perfect Bayesian equilibrium; motivated reasoning; divergent beliefs; universal divinity refinement; motivated anchoring; non-cooperative games; disputes; pretrial bargaining

JEL:

C72
  1. Quota Manipulation and Fair Voting Rules in Committees

Date:

2012-03

By:

František Turnovec (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2012_08&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Fairness, optimal quota, simple weighted committee, strict proportional power, voting and power indices.

JEL:

C71
  1. The Allocation of a Prize

Date:

2012-04-13

By:

Pradeep K. Dubey
Siddhartha Sahi

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000402&r=gth
  1. Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Date:

2012-04-13

By:

Johannes Horner
Larry Samuelson

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000418&r=gth
  1. Every man for himself. Gender, Norms and Survival in Maritime Disasters

Date:

2012-04-10

By:

Elinder, Mikael (Department of Economics)
Erixson, Oscar (Department of Economics)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2012_008&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Social norms; Disaster; Women and children first; Mortality; High stakes

JEL:

C70
  1. Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment

Date:

2012-04

By:

Alistair J. Wilson
Emanuel Vespa

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:461&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Multiple Senders, Strategic Information Transmission, Experiment, Recommendations

JEL:

C72

Laisser un commentaire

Entrez vos coordonnées ci-dessous ou cliquez sur une icône pour vous connecter:

Logo WordPress.com

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte WordPress.com. Déconnexion / Changer )

Image Twitter

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte Twitter. Déconnexion / Changer )

Photo Facebook

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte Facebook. Déconnexion / Changer )

Photo Google+

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte Google+. Déconnexion / Changer )

Connexion à %s