Game Theory: working papers (RePEc, 30/03/2012)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  1. On Uniform Conditions for the Existence of Mixed Strategy Equilibria

Date:

2012-03

By:

Pavlo Prokopovych (Kyiv School of Economics, Kyiv Economic Institute)
Nicholas C. Yannelis (University of Iowa/ The University of Manchester)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kse:dpaper:48&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Discontinuous game; Diagonally transfer continuous game; Payoff secure game; Mixed strategy equilibrium; Transfer lower semicontinuity

JEL:

C65
  1. Cycles with Anonymous Actions and Generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors Games

Date:

2012

By:

Eric Bahel
Hans Haller

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vpi:wpaper:e07-34&r=gth
 

Keywords:

cycle, Nash equilibrium, minimax theorem.
  1. Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks

Date:

2012-02-01

By:

Ruben Juarez (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)
Rajnish Kumar (Department of Economics, Louisiana State University)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:201203&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Cost-sharing, Implementation, Average Cost, Egalitarian Mechanism

JEL:

C70
  1. Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games: A Note

Date:

2012

By:

Timo Heinrich
Irenaeus Wolff

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0074&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Salience, level-k reasoning, cognitive hierarchy, hide-and-seek game, framing effect
  1. Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis

Date:

2012-03

By:

Sebastian Braun, Nadja Dwenger, Dorothea Kübler, Alexander Westkamp

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kie:kieliw:1761&r=gth
 

Keywords:

College admissions, experiment, quotas, matching, Gale-Shapley mechanism, Boston mechanism

JEL:

C78
  1. The Strategic Formation of Networks: Experimental Evidence

Date:

2012-01

By:

Carrillo, Juan D
Gaduh, Arya

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8757&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Laboratory experiments; Myopic rationality; Pairwise stable equilibria; Social networks

JEL:

C73
  1. Fuzzy Rejective Core of Satiated Economies with Unbounded Consumption Sets

Date:

2012-03

By:

Nizar Allouch (Queen Mary, University of London)
Monique Florenzano (Paris School of Economics)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp690&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Exchange economy, Satiation, Equilibrium with dividends, Rejective core, Fuzzy rejective core, Core equivalence

JEL:

D50
  1. Stability, efficiency and monotonicity in two-sided matching

Date:

2012-03-09

By:

Salem, Sherif Gamal

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37215&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Stability; Efficiency; Monotonicity; Two-Sided Matching

JEL:

C78
  1. Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation

Date:

2012

By:

Irenaeus Wolff

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0075&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Public goods, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Strong reciprocity, Counter-punishment
  1. Crossing the Point of No Return: A Public Goods Experiment

Date:

2012

By:

Urs Fischbacher
Sabrina Teyssier
Simeon Schudy

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0073&r=gth
 

Keywords:

public goods, social preferences, conditional cooperation, heterogeneity
  1. Stable sets: a descriptive and comparative analysis

Date:

2012-03-16

By:

Peris, Josep E. (Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica)
Subiza, Begoña (Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:qmetal:2012_006&r=gth
 

Keywords:

stable; g-stable; B-stable; admissible set

JEL:

D71
  1. Can issue linkage help mitigate externalities and enhance cooperation

Date:

2011-06

By:

Pham Do, Kim Hang
Dinar, Ariel
McKinney, Daene

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37408&r=gth
 

Keywords:

games with externalities; convexity; s-core; transboundary rivers; issue linkage; international water sharing agreement

JEL:

D62
  1. Motives for Sharing in Social Networks

Date:

2011-12-01

By:

Ligon, Ethan
Schechter, Laura

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt4sn304b6&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Social Sciences, General, Economics
  1. Group Strategyproof Cost Sharing: The Role of Indifferences

Date:

2012-02-01

By:

Ruben Juarez (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:201202&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Cost sharing, Mechanism design, Group strategyproof, Tie-breaking rule

JEL:

C72
  1. Homo Moralis-Preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching

Date:

2012-02

By:

Alger, Ingela
Weibull, Jörgen

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:25607&r=gth
 

JEL:

C73
  1. A Proportional Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with a guaranteed minimum.

Date:

2012-03-22

By:

Peris, Josep E. (Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica)
Jiménez-Gómez, José M. (Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department d’Economia CREIP and GRODE)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:qmetal:2012_007&r=gth
 

Keywords:

Bankruptcy problems; Proportional rule; Equal Awards; Convex combination of rules; Lorenz dominance

JEL:

C71
  1. Efficient Cheap Talk in Directed Search: On the Non-essentiality of Commitment in Market Games

Date:

2012-01

By:

Kim, Kyungmin
Kircher, Philipp

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8759&r=gth
 

Keywords:

cheap talk; commitment; competitive search; directed search

JEL:

C72

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