Microéconomie: working papers (RePEc, 23/03/2012)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  1. Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning.

Date:

2012-02

By:

Tirole, Jean

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:toulou:http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/3063/&r=mic
 

JEL:

H81
  1. Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

Date:

2012-03-12

By:

George Mailath (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)
Andrew Postlewaite (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)
Larry Samuelson (Department of Economics, Yale University)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:12-008&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

JEL:

C78
  1. Subjective Learning, Second Version

Date:

2011-09-30

By:

David Dillenberger (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)
Philipp Sadowski (Department of Economics, Duke University)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:12-007&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Resolution of uncertainty, second-order beliefs, preference for flexibility, valuing binary bets more, generalized partition, subjective filtration.

JEL:

D80
  1. Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations

Date:

2011

By:

Nicola Doni
Domenico Menicucci

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2011/27&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Asymmetric auctions, First price auctions, Second price auctions

JEL:

D44
  1. Flexible contracts

Date:

2011

By:

Piero Gottardi
Jean Marc Tallon
Paolo Ghirardato

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2011/26&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Delegation, Flexibility, Agency Costs, Multiple Priors, Imprecision Aversion

JEL:

D86
  1. Dynamic Rawlsian Policy

Date:

2012

By:

Charles Brendon
Martin Ellison

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:595&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Macroeconomic policy, Rawls, Time inconsistency, Veil of ignorance

JEL:

E52
  1. Competing with Equivocal Information

Date:

2012-02-29

By:

Eduardo Perez-Richet (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique – CNRS : UMR7176 – Polytechnique – X)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00675126&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Strategic Information Transmission, Persuasion Games, Communication, Competition, Multiple Senders.
  1. Mechanism Design and Intentions

Date:

2012-03-12

By:

Felix Bierbrauer
Nick Netzer

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kls:series:0053&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Mechanism Design, Psychological Games, Social Preferences, Intentions, Reciprocity, Revelation Principle

JEL:

C70
  1. The Second Fundamental Theorem of Positive Economics.

Date:

2012-03

By:

Mukherji, Anjan (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:npf:wpaper:12/98&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Stability of equilibrium ; Redistribution of resources ; Rank condition ; Fundamental theorems
  1. Rationing in the presence of baselines

Date:

2012-03-12

By:

Hougaard, Jens Leth (Institute of Food and Resource Economics)
Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. (Department of Economics)
Østerdal, Lars Peter (Department of Business and Economics)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2012_008&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Rationing; baselines; claims; operators; solidarity

JEL:

D63
  1. Allocation Rules on Networks

Date:

2012-03-11

By:

Rahmi Ilkiliç
Çâatay Kayi

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000092:009380&r=mic
 
  1. Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

Date:

2012-03-11

By:

Paula Jaramillo
Çâatay Kayi
Flip Klijn

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000092:009381&r=mic
 
  1. Aggregate Uncertainty Can Lead to Herds

Date:

2012

By:

Ignacio Monzón

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:245&r=mic
 

Keywords:

observational learning, social learning, word-of-mouth, herding

JEL:

C72
  1. Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem

Date:

2012-02

By:

Jörg Franke
Christian Kanzow
Wolfgang Leininger
Alexandra Schwartz

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0315&r=mic
 

Keywords:

All-pay auction; lottery contest; bias; revenue

JEL:

C72
  1. The value of Repeated Games with an informed controller.

Date:

2012-02

By:

Renault, Jérôme

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:toulou:http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/3062/&r=mic
  1. Optimal regulation in the presence of reputation concerns

Date:

2012

By:

Andrew Atkeson
Christian Hellwig
Guillermo L. Ordonez

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedmsr:464&r=mic
  1. Kantian Optimization, Social Ethos, and Pareto Efficiency

Date:

2012-03

By:

John E. Roemer (Dept. of Political Science, Yale University)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1854&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Kantian equilibrium, Social ethos, Implementation

JEL:

D60
  1. Stability versus rationality in choice functions

Date:

2012-03-13

By:

Subiza, Begoña (Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica)
Peris, Josep E. (Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:qmetal:2012_005&r=mic
 

Keywords:

stable set; admissible set; Condorcet choice function

JEL:

D11
  1. M-stability: A reformulation of Von Neumann-Morgenstern stability

Date:

2012-03-07

By:

Peris, Josep E. (Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica)
Subiza, Begoña (Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:qmetal:2012_004&r=mic
 

Keywords:

stable set; generalized-stable; socially-stable; m-stable; admissible set

JEL:

D11
  1. Inferring preferences from choices under uncertainty

Date:

2012-03

By:

Christoph Kuzmics (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:462&r=mic
 

Keywords:

ambiguity, decision theory, Knightian uncertainty, experiments

JEL:

C72
  1. Asymmetric Awareness and Moral Hazard

Date:

2011

By:

Sarah Auster

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2011/31&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Unawareness, Moral Hazard, Incomplete Contracts.
  1. Risk-Sharing and Retrading in Incomplete Markets

Date:

2012

By:

Piero Gottardi
Rohit Rahi

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2012/03&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Competitive Equilibrium; Incomplete Markets; Information; Re-trading;

JEL:

D52

Laisser un commentaire

Entrez vos coordonnées ci-dessous ou cliquez sur une icône pour vous connecter:

Logo WordPress.com

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte WordPress.com. Déconnexion / Changer )

Image Twitter

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte Twitter. Déconnexion / Changer )

Photo Facebook

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte Facebook. Déconnexion / Changer )

Photo Google+

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte Google+. Déconnexion / Changer )

Connexion à %s