Microéconomie: working papers (RePEc, 24/11/2011)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  1. Price Controls and Consumer Surplus

Date:

2011-10

By:

Bulow, Jeremy (Stanford University)
Klemperer, Paul (Oxford University)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:2086&r=mic
 

JEL:

D45
  1. Multimarket Competition and Welfare Effects of Price discrimination.

Date:

2011-11-15

By:

Iñaki Aguirre (UPV/EHU)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:ikerla:201155&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Price discrimination, multimsarket competition, welfare analysis

JEL:

L13
  1. Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Ippolito Meets Schmalensee and .

Date:

2011-11-11

By:

Iñaki Aguirre (UPV/EHU)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:ikerla:201154&r=mic
 

JEL:

D42
  1. Common Agency with Informed Principals: Menus and Signals

Date:

2011-30-31

By:

Simone Galperti

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1541&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Common agency, informed principals, Inscrutability Principle, Delegation Principle, menus, signals, direct revelation mechanisms.
  1. Preference for Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion

Date:

2011-04-10

By:

Kaito Sato

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1524&r=mic
 

JEL:

D81
  1. A model of influence based on aggregation functions

Date:

2011-10

By:

Michel Grabisch (CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I, EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris)
Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00639677&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Influence, aggregation function, convergence, terminal class, influential coalition, social network.
  1. Concave Consumption Function and Precautionary Wealth Accumulation

Date:

2011-11

By:

Richard M. H. Suen (University of Connecticut)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2011-23&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Consumption function, borrowing constraints, precautionary saving

JEL:

D81
  1. Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities ?

Date:

2011

By:

Etienne Billette De Villemeur (EQUIPPE – ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE, INTEGRATION, POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES ET ECONOMETRIE – Université des Sciences et Technologies de Lille – Lille I)
Richard Ruble (EMLYON RECHERCHE – EMLYON Business School, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – CNRS : UMR5824 – Université Lumière – Lyon II – École Normale Supérieure de Lyon)
Bruno Versaevel (EMLYON RECHERCHE – EMLYON Business School, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – CNRS : UMR5824 – Université Lumière – Lyon II – École Normale Supérieure de Lyon)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00639471&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Investment Timing; Real Options; Simultaneous Equilibrium; Joint-Value Maximization; Cooperation; Investment Externalities
  1. Fairness in Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution

Date:

2011-11-03

By:

Rachmilevitch, Shiran (Department of Economics, University of Haifa)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201112&r=mic
 

Keywords:

Bargaining; fairness; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

JEL:

D63
  1. No place to hide: When shame causes proselfs to cooperate

Date:

2011-11

By:

Declerck C.H.
Boone Ch.
Kiyonari T.

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ant:wpaper:2011018&r=mic
 
  1. The Language Game: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Language Contact.

Date:

2011-11-15

By:

Nagore Iriberri (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
José Ramón Uriarte (UPV/EHU)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200624&r=mic
 

Laisser un commentaire

Entrez vos coordonnées ci-dessous ou cliquez sur une icône pour vous connecter:

Logo WordPress.com

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte WordPress.com. Déconnexion / Changer )

Image Twitter

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte Twitter. Déconnexion / Changer )

Photo Facebook

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte Facebook. Déconnexion / Changer )

Photo Google+

Vous commentez à l'aide de votre compte Google+. Déconnexion / Changer )

Connexion à %s