Théorie des jeux: working papers (RePEc, 28/05/2011)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  1. Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces

Date:

2011

By:

Bajoori Elnaz
Flesch János
Vermeulen Dries (METEOR)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2011029&r=gth

Keywords:

mathematical economics;
  1. On Coalitional Stability and Single-peakedness

Date:

2011-05

By:

Hirofumi Yamamura (Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2011-21&r=gth

Keywords:

Single-peakedness, Augmented median voter rule, Strong Nash equilibrium, Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium, Minimax theorem, Manipulation.

JEL:

D78
  1. A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction

Date:

2011-04

By:

Lombardi, Michele
Yoshihara, Naoki

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:hituec:a548&r=gth

Keywords:

Nash implementation, strategy space reduction, s-mechanisms, Condition μsr, Condition Ms

JEL:

C72
  1. Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner’s dilemma game

Date:

2011-05-11

By:

Duffy, Sean
Smith, John

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:30856&r=gth

Keywords:

cognitive resources; experimental economics; experimental game theory; public goods game

JEL:

C72
  1. New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment

Date:

2011-05

By:

Cheung, Stephen L. (University of Sydney)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5689&r=gth

Keywords:

conditional cooperation, selfish bias, punishment, public good experiment, strategy method

JEL:

C72
  1. Virtual trust: Escalation Bargaining: Theoretical Analysis and Experimental Test

Date:

2011-05-13

By:

Swee-Hoon Chuah (Nottingham University Business School)
Robert Hoffmann (Nottingham University Business School)
Jeremy Larner (Nottingham University Business School)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bbr:workpa:16&r=gth

Keywords:

Escalation, Brinkmanship, Chicken game, Experiments

JEL:

C72
  1. Monetary Policy Games, Instability and Incomplete Information

Date:

2011-04

By:

Richard Barrett
Ioanna Kokores
Somnath Sen

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bir:birmec:11-10&r=gth

Keywords:

Monetary policy, central bank, financial stability, strategic behaviour, incomplete information

JEL:

E44
  1. Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experimental study on “Broken (and Fixed) Windows”

Date:

2011-03

By:

Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
Sebastian Kube (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
Michael Kurschilgen (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_05&r=gth
  1. Pareto-Optimal Matching Allocation Mechanisms for Boundedly Rational Agents

Date:

2010-12

By:

Sophie Bade (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_47&r=gth

Keywords:

Bounded Rationality, House Allocation Problems, Fundamental Theorems of Welfare, Multiple Rationales

JEL:

C78
  1. Observational Learning with Position Uncertainty

Date:

2011

By:

Ignacio Monzon
Michael Rapp

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:206&r=gth

Keywords:

social learning; information aggregation; herds; position uncertainty; observational learning

JEL:

C72
  1. Artificial Agents as an Application to Policy Design: The Market Entry Game

Date:

2011

By:

Bejerano, Hernan
Latek, Maciej M.

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea11:103900&r=gth

Keywords:

Marketing,
  1. On the dynamics of bargaining

Date:

2011-05

By:

D. Pinheiro
A. A. Pinto
S. Z. Xanthopoulos
A. N. Yannacopoulos

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1105.1767&r=gth

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