Théorie des jeux: working papers (RePEc, 10/05/2011)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  1. Strategic control of myopic best reply in repeated games

Date:

2011-04-05

By:

Schipper, Burkhard C

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:30219&r=gth

Keywords:

strategic teaching; learning; adaptive heuristics; dynamic optimization; strategic substitutes; strategic complements; myopic players

JEL:

C70
  1. Strategic communication networks

Date:

2011-04-18

By:

Jeanne Hagenbach (CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I, Université Panthéon Sorbonne – Paris 1 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I)
Frédéric Koessler (PSE – Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques – CNRS : UMR8545 – Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – Ecole des Ponts ParisTech – Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris – ENS Paris, EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00586847&r=gth

Keywords:

cheap talk ; coordination ; partially verifiable types ; public and private communication
  1. Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games

Date:

2011-03-30

By:

Heifetz, Aviad
Meier, Martin
Schipper, Burkhard C

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:30220&r=gth

Keywords:

Prudent rationalizability; caution; extensive-form rationalizability; extensive-form games; unawareness; verifiable communication

JEL:

C70
  1. Subgame perfect implementation: A new result

Date:

2011-04-13

By:

Wu, Haoyang

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:30286&r=gth

Keywords:

Mechanism design; Subgame perfect implementation; Quantum game theory.

JEL:

D71
  1. Computations on Simple Games using REL VIEW

Date:

2011-03

By:

Rudolf Berghammer (Institut für Informatik – Universitat Kiel)
Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I)
Harrie De Swart (Department of Philosophy – Erasmus University Rotterdam)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00587690&r=gth

Keywords:

Simple games, relation algebra, RelView.
  1. Currency Speculation in a Game-Theoretic Model of International Reserves

Date:

2011

By:

Carlos J. Perez (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Manuel S. Santos (Department of Economics, University of Miami)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mia:wpaper:2011-2&r=gth

Keywords:

Currency speculation, international reserves, currency crises, global games, asymmetric information.

JEL:

F31
  1. A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations

Date:

2011-04

By:

Emmanuel Maruani (Nomura International – Nomura International)
Michel Grabisch (CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I)
Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00587820&r=gth

Keywords:

Social network, inclination, decision, influence function, differential equations.
  1. Gambling for the Upper Hand – Settlement Negotiations in the Lab

Date:

2011-04-19

By:

Topi Miettinen (Hanken School of Economics, Dept of Economics, Helsinki; and SITE, Stockholm School of Economics)
Olli Ropponen (Government Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki)
Pekka Sääskilahti (Nokia Corporation)

URL:

http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-022&r=gth

Keywords:

bargaining, litigation, loss aversion, self-serving bias, settlement

JEL:

C72

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