Théorie des jeux: working papers (RePEc, 07/03/2011)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  • Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality
Date: 2011-01
By: Robin Cubitt (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)
Robert Sugden (School of Economics, University of East Anglia)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2011-01&r=gth
Keywords: Common reasoning; common knowledge; common knowledge of rationality; David Lewis; Bayesian models of games
  • Cooperation amongst competing agents in minority games
Date: 2011-02
By: Deepak Dhar
V. Sasidevan
Bikas K. Chakrabarti
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1102.4230&r=gth
  • Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
Date: 2010-09
By: Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
Stephen Morris (Dept. of Economics, Princeton University)
Satoru Takahashi (Dept. of Economics, Princeton University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1772r&r=gth
Keywords: Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability
JEL: C79
  • Myopic or Farsighted? An Experiment on Network Formation
Date: 2011-02
By: Marco Mantovani
Georg Kirchsteiger
Ana Mauleon
Vincent Vannetelbosch
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/76051&r=gth
Keywords: Network fomation; Experiment; Myopic and farsighted stability
JEL: D85
  • One Player Games versus Two Player Games: Comparing Agribusiness Cooperatives with Investor-Owned Business Models
Date: 2011
By: Parker, Frederick
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aare11:100691&r=gth
Keywords: Cooperatives, Game Theory, Collective Action, Agricultural Economics, Theory of the Firm, Agribusiness, B5, C7, D7, L2, L3, Q1,
  • ‘Hiding behind a small cake’ in a newspaper dictator game
Date: 2011-02-25
By: Axel Ockenfels
Peter Werner
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kls:series:0051&r=gth
Keywords: dictator game, psychological games, incomplete information, newspaper experiment
  • Global emission ceiling versus international cap and trade: What is the most efficient system when countries act non-cooperatively?
Date: 2011-02-21
By: Jacqueline Morgan (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEf)
Fabien Prieur (LAMETA, Université Montpellier I and INRA)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:275&r=gth
Keywords: climate change, international cap and trade system, national emission quotas, global emission cap, normalized equilibria, variational and quasi-variational inequalities.
JEL: Q28

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