Théorie des jeux: working papers (RePEc, 02/03/2011)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  • Games on Union Closed Systems
Date: 2011-02-14
By: Rene van den Brink (VU University Amsterdam)
Ilya Katsev (Russian Academy of Sciences, St Petersburg)
Gerard van der Laan (VU University Amsterdam)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20110036&r=gth
Keywords: TU-game; restricted cooperation; union closed system; core; prekernel; nucleolus
JEL: C71
  • Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
Date: 2010-07-08
By: Rene van den Brink (VU University Amsterdam)
Yukihiko Funaki (School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University Tokyo)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100065&r=gth
Keywords: Cooperative TU-game; Shapley value; equal division solution; delta-discounted Shapley value; Axiomatization; Implementation; Discounting
JEL: C71
  • The Condorcet Paradox Revisited
Date: 2010-03-01
By: P. Jean-Jacques Herings (Maastricht University)
Harold Houba (VU University Amsterdam)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100026&r=gth
Keywords: Bargaining; Condorcet Paradox; Consistent Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Risk Aversion; Compromise Prone
JEL: C73
  • But Some Neutrally Stable Strategies are More Neutrally Stable than Others
Date: 2010-03-19
By: Matthijs van Veelen (University of Amsterdam)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100033&r=gth
Keywords: Robustness against indirect invasions; neutrally stable strategy; evolutionarily stable strategy; extensive form game
JEL: C73
  • Lying and Friendship
Date: 2011-02
By: Sugato Chakravarty (Purdue University)
Yongjin Ma (Purdue University)
Sandra Maximiano (Purdue University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csr:wpaper:1007&r=gth
Keywords: Lying, Friendship, social ties, deceptive behavior, signal, experiment
JEL: G21
  • In and Out of Equilibrium: Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting
Date: 2010-04-08
By: Matthijs van Veelen (CREED, Universiteit van Amsterdam)
Julian Garcia (Vrije Universiteit)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100037&r=gth
Keywords: Repeated games; evolution; robust against indirect invasions; simulation
JEL: C73
  • Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results
Date: 2011-02-13
By: Lombardi, Michele
Yoshihara, Naoki
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28838&r=gth
Keywords: Nash implementation; canonical-mechanisms; s-mechanisms; self-relevant mechanisms; partial-honesty; permissive results.
JEL: D71
  • Estimation of Finite Sequential Games
Date: 2010-11
By: Shiko Maruyama (School of Economics, University of New South Wales)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:swe:wpaper:2010-22&r=gth
Keywords: Inference In Discrete Games; Sequential Games; Monte Carlo Integration; GHK Simulator; Subgame Perfection; Perfect Information
JEL: C35
  • Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC Rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
Date: 2011-02-14
By: Adrian de Groot Ruiz (University of Amsterdam)
Theo Offerman (University of Amsterdam)
Sander Onderstal (University of Amsterdam)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20110037&r=gth
Keywords: cheap talk; neologism proofness; announcement proofness; credible deviation; ACDC; experiment
JEL: C72
  • Balanced Consistency and Balanced Cost Reduction for Sequencing Problems
Date: 2010-03-19
By: Rene van den Brink (VU University Amsterdam)
Youngsub Chun (Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100035&r=gth
Keywords: Sequencing problem; minimal transfer rule; balanced consistency; balanced cost reduction
JEL: D63
  • Bargaining with Linked Disagreement Points
Date: 2011-02-01
By: Justin Leroux
Walid Marrouch
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2011s-30&r=gth
Keywords: Multi-issue bargaining, issue linkages, axiomatic solutions, disagree-ment point. , Négociations Multi-sujets, inter-connexion des sujets, solutions axiomatiques, point de Menace.
JEL: C78
  • Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game
Date: 2011-01
By: Chirantan Ganguly
Indrajit Ray
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bir:birmec:05-08rr&r=gth
Keywords: Cheap talk, Mediated Equilibrium
JEL: C72
  • Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real.
Date: 2011-02-17
By: Elena Inarra (UPV/EHU)
Annick Laruelle (UPV/EHU)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:ikerla:201150&r=gth
JEL: C72
  • On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems
Date: 2011-02-13
By: Alcalde, Jose
Romero-Medina, Antonio
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28831&r=gth
Keywords: School allocation problem; Pareto efficient matching
JEL: D71
  • Collective Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
Date: 2011-02
By: Dobbelaere, Sabien (VU University Amsterdam)
Luttens, Roland Iwan (Ghent University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5518&r=gth
Keywords: collective bargaining, union, firm, bargaining power, non-binding contract
JEL: C71
  • A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
Date: 2011-02-18
By: Brams, Steven J.
Kaplan, Todd R
Kilgour, D. Marc
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28999&r=gth
Keywords: Bargaining; truth-telling mechanisms; probabilistic implementation; incomplete information.
JEL: C78
  • Information and Strategic Voting
Date: 2011-02-10
By: Marcelo Tyszler (University of Amsterdam)
Arthur Schram (University of Amsterdam)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20110025&r=gth
Keywords: Voting Behavior; Experimental Economics; Quantal Response Equilibrium
JEL: C92
  • The Trust Game behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences
Date: 2010-07-05
By: Jana Vyrastekova (Radboud University Nijmegen)
Sander Onderstal (University of Amsterdam)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100063&r=gth
Keywords: trust game; experiment; strategy method behind the veil of ignorance; gender differences
JEL: C72
  • Preferences, actions and voting rules.
Date: 2011-02-17
By: Alaitz Artabe (UPV/EHU)
Annick Laruelle (UPV/EHU and Ikerbasque)
Federico Valenciano (UPV/EHU)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:ikerla:201148&r=gth
  • Two-way Flow Networks with Small Decay
Date: 2010-12-10
By: K. De Jaegher (Utrecht University)
J.J.A. Kamphorst (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100125&r=gth
Keywords: Network formation; two-way flow model; decay; non-linear benefits
JEL: C72
  • Minimal exact balancedness
Date: 2011
By: Lohmann E.
Borm P.
Herings P.J.J. (METEOR)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2011009&r=gth
Keywords: operations research and management science;
  • The Herodotus Paradox
Date: 2010-09-02
By: Michael R. Baye (Indiana University)
Dan Kovenock (University of Iowa)
Casper G. de Vries (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100090&r=gth
Keywords: second price; transfer to loser
JEL: C72
  • Semiparametric Estimation of Markov Decision Processeswith Continuous State Space
Date: 2010-08
By: Oliver Linton
Sorawoot Srisuma
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stiecm:/2010/550&r=gth
Keywords: Discrete Markov Decision Models, Kernel Smoothing, Markovian Games, Semi-parametric Estimation, Well-Posed Inverse Problem.D
  • Nonemptiness of the alpha-core
Date: 2011
By: V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha
Nicholas C. Yannelis
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:man:sespap:1105&r=gth
  • Exclusion in the All-Pay Auction: An Experimental Investigation
Date: 2011-02
By: Dietmar Fehr
Julia Schmid
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2011-009&r=gth
Keywords: experiments, contests, all-pay auction, heterogeneity, regret aversion
JEL: C72
  • Market Power in Water Markets
Date: 2010-05-27
By: Erik Ansink (IVM, VU University Amsterdam, and Wageningen University)
Harold Houba (VU University Amsterdam)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100054&r=gth
Keywords: Water markets; oligopoly; market power; Cournot-Walras equilibrium
JEL: C72

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