Théorie des jeux: working papers (RePEc, 22/02/2011)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  • Heterogeneous Network Games: Conflicting Preferences
Date: 2011-02
By: Penelope Hernandez (ERI-CES)
Edson Manuel Muñoz Herrera (ERI-CES)
Angel Sanchez (University Carlos III)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0411&r=gth
Keywords: Heterogeneity, Networks, Nash Equilibrium, Stability
JEL: C72
  • The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games
Date: 2011-02-08
By: Béal, Sylvain
Lardon, Aymeric
Rémila, Eric
Solal, Philippe
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28739&r=gth
Keywords: Average tree solution; Communication graph; (pre-)Core; Hierarchical outcomes; Multi-choice games.
JEL: C71
  • Endogenous preferences in games with type indeterminate players
Date: 2010-06
By: Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky (PSE – Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques – CNRS : UMR8545 – Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – Ecole des Ponts ParisTech – Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris – ENS Paris – INRA, EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00564895&r=gth
Keywords: type indeterminacy ; games ; endogeneous preferences
  • A value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
Date: 2011-02
By: Emilio Calvo (ERI-CES)
Esther Gutierrez (University Pais Vasco)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0311&r=gth
Keywords: Coalitional value, Shapley value, Owen value, Solidarity value
JEL: C71
  • On evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics in asymmetric two-population games
Date: 2010-07
By: Elvio Accinelli (Facultad de Economía, Universidad Autónoma de san Luis Potosí. Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)
Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera (Department of Economics at the University of Siena.)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ude:wpaper:1010&r=gth
Keywords: Asymmetric game; Evolutionary games; ESS; Replicator dynamics.
JEL: C72
  • How to play the games? Nash versus Berge behavior rules
Date: 2011-05
By: Pierre Courtois
Rabia Nessah
Tarik Tazdaït
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lam:wpaper:05-11&r=gth
  • Using or Hiding Private Information ? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Date: 2011-01
By: Nicolas Jacquemet (CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I, EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris)
Frédéric Koessler (PSE – Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques – CNRS : UMR8545 – Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – Ecole des Ponts ParisTech – Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris – ENS Paris)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00565157&r=gth
Keywords: Concavification, laboratory experiments, incomplete information, value of information, zero-sum repeated games.
  • On the Strategic Disclosure of Feasible Options in Bargaining
Date: 2011
By: Geoffroy de Clippel
Kfir Eliaz
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2011-5&r=gth
  • Tensión diplomática entre Colombia y Ecuador durante 2006-2009: una mirada desde la teoría de juegos.
Date: 2010-09-21
By: Arroyo, Santiago
Bolaños, Juan
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28751&r=gth
Keywords: Game Theory; diplomatic relations
JEL: F50
  • Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects in Simultaneous Games with Incomplete Information, Second Version
Date: 2010-06-29
By: Aureo de Paula (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)
Xun Tang (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:11-003&r=gth
Keywords: identification, inference, multiple equilibria, incomplete information games
JEL: C01
  • Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Part II: Epistemic Foundations
Date: 2011-01
By: Bonanno, Giacomo (University of CA, Davis)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:ucdeco:11-1&r=gth
  • « Upping the ante »: How to design efficient auctions with entry?
Date: 2010-06
By: Laurent Lamy (PSE – Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques – CNRS : UMR8545 – Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) – Ecole des Ponts ParisTech – Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris – ENS Paris – INRA, EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00564888&r=gth
Keywords: auctions ; auctions with entry ; shill bidding ; commitment failure ; hold-up ; posted-price ; cancelation rights ; jump bids ; bilateral asymmetric information
  • Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation Revisited
Date: 2011-02-10
By: Alex Gershkov
Benny Moldovanu
Xianwen Shi
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-422&r=gth
Keywords: Bayesian Implementation, Dominant Strategy Implementation, Equivalence
JEL: D80
  • On the Number of alpha-Pivotal Players
Date: 2011-02
By: Johannes Gerd Becker (ETH Zurich, Switzerland)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:11-142&r=gth
Keywords: alpha-pivotal agent, influence, direct mechanism, decomposition of variance
JEL: D62
  • The Profitability of Small Horizontal Mergers with Nonlinear Demand Functions
Date: 2011-02
By: H. Esfahani
L. Lambertini
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp728&r=gth
JEL: C73
  • Crédibilité en matière de ciblage d’inflation
Date: 2011-02-08
By: Gürbüz Beşek, Yeşim (Galatasaray University Economic Research Center)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:giamwp:2011_001&r=gth
Keywords: Politique monétaire; ciblage d’inflation; crédibilité; jeux non coopératifs
JEL: C72

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