Théorie des jeux: working papers (RePEc, 31/01/2011)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  • A Cooperative Value for Bayesian Games
Date: 2010-06-20
By: Adam Kalai
Ehud Kalai
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1512&r=gth
  • Maintaining a Permanent Reputation with Replacements
Date: 2010-04
By: Mehmet Ekmekci
Andrea Wilson
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1511&r=gth
Keywords: Reputation, repeated games, replacements, disappearing reputations JEL Classification Numbers: D80, C73
  • Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems
Date: 2010-03-01
By: Mehmet Ekmekci
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1505&r=gth
Keywords: Reputations, Rating Systems, Online Reputation Mechanisms, Disappearing Reputations, Permanent Reputations. JEL Classification Numbers: D82
  • Cognitive abilities and behavior in strategic-form games.*
Date: 2011-01
By: Ralph-C. Bayer
Ludovic Renou
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:11/16&r=gth
Keywords: cognitive ability; behaviours; strategic-form games; experiments; preferences; sophistication
JEL: C70
  • Using or Hiding Private Information ? An experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.
Date: 2011-01
By: Nicolas Jacquemet (Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne – Paris School of Economics)
Frédéric Koessler (Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11002&r=gth
Keywords: Concavification, laboratory experiments, incomplete information, value of information, zero-sum repeated games.
JEL: C72
  • Voting in Small Committees
Date: 2011
By: Paolo Balduzzi (Università Cattolica Milano)
Clara Graziano (Università degli Studi di Udine)
Annalisa Luporini (Università degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2011_01.rdf&r=gth
Keywords: Voting, Small committees.
JEL: D71
  • Bilateral and Community Enforcement in a Networked Market with Simple Strategies
Date: 2011
By: Itay P. Fainmesser
David A. Goldberg
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2011-2&r=gth
Keywords: Networks, moral hazard, graph theory, repeated games
  • Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem
Date: 2011-01-18
By: Alcalde, Jose
Romero-Medina, Antonio
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28206&r=gth
Keywords: School allocation problem; Pareto efficient matching
JEL: D71
  • Network Topology and Equilibrium Existence in Weighted Network Congestion Games
Date: 2011-01-17
By: Igal Milchtaich
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000001185&r=gth
  • Decision costs in legislative bargaining: An experimental analysis
Date: 2011-01
By: Luis Miller (Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, Nuffield College, University of Oxford)
Christoph Vanberg (Department of Economics, University of Cambridge)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cex:dpaper:2011002&r=gth
Keywords: Collective decision-making, Majority rule, Unanimity, Legislative bargaining, Experimental economics
JEL: C78
  • Evolutionary strategic beliefs and financial markets
Date: 2010-12-08
By: Elyès Jouini (CEREMADE – CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision – CNRS : UMR7534 – Université Paris Dauphine – Paris IX)
Clotilde Napp (CREST – Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique – INSEE – École Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Administration Économique, DRM – Dauphine Recherches en Management – CNRS : UMR7088 – Université Paris Dauphine – Paris IX)
Yannick Viossat (CEREMADE – CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision – CNRS : UMR7534 – Université Paris Dauphine – Paris IX)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00556490&r=gth
Keywords: Beliefs formation, strategic beliefs, optimal beliefs, distorded beliefs, pessimism, risk premium
  • Search and Homophily in Social Networks
Date: 2010
By: Sergio Currarini (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari)
Fernando Vega Redondo (European University Institute)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2010_24&r=gth
Keywords: Homophily, search, social networks, segregation.
JEL: D7

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