Théorie des jeux: working papers (RePEc, 20/01/2011)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  • Splitting Games: Nash Equilibrium and the Optimisation Problem
Date: 2010-08-10
By: Ana Paula Martins
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eei:rpaper:eeri_rp_2010_36&r=gth
Keywords: Non-Cooperative N-Person Games, Infinite Horizon, Mixed Strategy Games, Mixed Strategies under Perfect Information Games, Simultaneous Sequential Bargaining, Matching Equilibrium under Sequential Bargaining, Synchronous (Decisions) Equilibrium under Sequential Bargaining, Mechanism Design, Bargaining Protocols, Dynamic Programming, Stationary Problems (without State Variables).
JEL: C72
  • Distribution-Valued Solution Concepts
Date: 2010-06
By: David H. Wolpert
James Bono
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:amu:wpaper:2010-13&r=gth
Keywords: Quantal Response Equilibrium, Bayesian Statistics, Entropic prior, Maximum entropy JEL Codes: C02, C11, C70, C72
  • Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games and Spillover Stability
Date: 2011-01
By: Ruud Hendrickx
Jacco Thijssen
Peter Borm
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:11/02&r=gth
Keywords: minimum cost spanning tree problems, transferable utility games, spillovers
JEL: C71
  • A theory of unstructured bargaining using distribution-valued solution concepts
Date: 2010-11
By: David H. Wolpert
James Bono
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:amu:wpaper:2010-14&r=gth
Keywords: JEL Codes:
  • Learning (Not) To Yield: An Experimental Study of Evolving Ultimatum Game Behavior
Date: 2010-12-15
By: Judith Avrahami (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for the Study of Rationality and School of Education)
Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena)
Ralph Hertwig (University of Basel, Department of Psychology)
Yaakov Kareev (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for the Study of Rationality and School of Education)
Hironori Otsubo (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-092&r=gth
Keywords: Ultimatum bargaining game, Reputation, Regret, Learning, Experiment
JEL: C78
  • Identifying Strategies and Beliefs without Rationality Assumptions
Date: 2010-05
By: Amos Golan
James Bono
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:amu:wpaper:2010-12&r=gth
Keywords: incomplete information, entropy, information theory, pairwise rationality, QRE, endogenous rationality JEL Codes: C70, C79
  • Nash Equilibrium and Robust Stability in Dynamic Games: A Small-Gain Perspective
Date: 2010-01-07
By: Karafyllis, Iasson
Jiang, Zhong-Ping
Athanasiou, George
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:26890&r=gth
Keywords: Dynamic game; Cournot oligopoly; Nash equilibrium; Robust stability; Small gain
JEL: C0
  • On the Impossibility of Regret Minimization in Repeated Games
Date: 2010-12
By: Karl Schlag (University of Vienna)
Andriy Zapechelnyuk (Queen Mary, University of London)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp676&r=gth
Keywords: Repeated games, Regret minimization, No-regret strategy
JEL: C73
  • Two-agent Nash implementation with partially-honest agents: Almost Full Characterizations
Date: 2010-12-22
By: Lombardi, Michele
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27834&r=gth
Keywords: Two-agent Nash implementation; intrinsic preferences for honesty; permissive results
JEL: D71
  • Subject-specific Performance Information can worsen the Tragedy of the Commons: Experimental Evidence
Date: 2010-01-09
By: Villena, Mauricio G.
Zecchetto, Franco
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27783&r=gth
Keywords: Common Property Resources; Information; Learning and Imitation; Experimental Economics.
JEL: D83
  • Markovian assignment rules
Date: 2010-12
By: Francis Bloch (Ecole Polytechnique)
David Cantala (El Colegio de México)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emx:ceedoc:2010-18&r=gth
Keywords: dynamic assignment, finite Markov chains, seniority, promotion rules
JEL: C78
  • Recent Developments in Empirical IO: Dynamic Demand and Dynamic Games
Date: 2010-12-31
By: Victor Aguirregabiria
Victor Aguirregabiria
Aviv Nevo
Aviv Nevo
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-419&r=gth
Keywords: Industrial Organization; Oligopoly competition; Dynamic demand; Dynamic games; Estimation; Counterfactual experiments; Multiple equilibria; Inclusive values; Unobserved heterogeneity.
JEL: L0
  • Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets
Date: 2010
By: Matteo Triossi
Antonio Romero-Medina
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edj:ceauch:273&r=gth

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