Théorie des jeux: working papers (RePEc, 21/12/2010)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  • Characterizing the Shapley Value in Fixed-Route Traveling Salesman Problems with Appointments
Date: 2010-12
By: Duygu Yengin (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adl:wpaper:2010-32&r=gth
Keywords: Fixed-route travelling salesman games, routing games, appointment games, the Shapley value, the core, transferable-utility games, merging and splitting proofness, networks, cost allocation
JEL: C71
  • The core of voting games with externalities
Date: 2010
By: Aymeric Lardon (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – CNRS : UMR5824 – Université Lumière – Lyon II – Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00544034_v1&r=gth
Keywords: voting games; externalities; core
  • Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation
Date: 2010-11
By: Michel Grabisch (CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I, EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00544134_v1&r=gth
Keywords: Cooperative game, core, restricted cooperation, bounded core, Weber set.
  • Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation.
Date: 2010-11
By: Michel Grabisch (Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne – Paris School of Economics)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10093&r=gth
Keywords: Cooperative game, core, restricted cooperation, bounded core, Weber set.
JEL: C7
  • Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products
Date: 2010
By: Aymeric Lardon (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – CNRS : UMR5824 – Université Lumière – Lyon II – Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00544056_v1&r=gth
Keywords: Bertrand oligopoly TU-games; Core; Convexity; Equal Division Solution
  • The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game
Date: 2010-12
By: Brian Roberson (Krannert School of Management, Economics Department, Purdue University)
Dmitriy Kvasov (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adl:wpaper:2010-31&r=gth
Keywords: Colonel Blotto Game; all-pay auction; contests; mixed strategies
JEL: C72
  • Cournot oligopoly interval games
Date: 2010
By: Aymeric Lardon (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – CNRS : UMR5824 – Université Lumière – Lyon II – Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00544044_v1&r=gth
Keywords: Cournot oligopoly interval game; Interval gamma-core; Standard gamma-core; Hurwicz criterion;
  • Evolutionary Stability, Co-operation and Hamilton’s Rule
Date: 2010-12-03
By: Ingela Alger (Department of Economics, Carleton University)
Jörgen W. Weibull (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:car:carecp:10-11&r=gth
JEL: C73
  • Absolute Optimal Solution For a Compact and Convex Game
Date: 2010-08
By: Rabia Nessah (IÉSEG School of Management, LEM-CNRS (UMR 8179),)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ies:wpaper:e201007&r=gth
Keywords: n-Person Game, Multiple objectives Game, Strong Equilibrium, Absolute Optimal Solution
  • Equilibrium notions and framing effects
Date: 2010-12
By: Christian Hilbe
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1012.1188&r=gth
  • Including Social Nash Equilibria in Abstract Economies
Date: 2010-12-11
By: M. Beatrice Lignola (Università di Napoli Federico II)
Jacqueline Morgan (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEf)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:268&r=gth
Keywords: quasi-variational, social Nash equilibria, approximate solution, closed map, lower semicontinuous map, upper stability, lower stability
  • The Behavioural Consequences of Unfair Punishment
Date: 2010-11
By: Michalis Drouvelis
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bir:birmec:10-34&r=gth
Keywords: Recriprocity, Unfair punishment, Public good experiments
JEL: C92
  • Best-of-Three Contests: Experimental Evidence
Date: 2010
By: Shakun D. Mago (Department of Economics, Robins School of Business, University of Richmond)
Roman Sheremeta (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University)
Andrew Yates (Department of Economics, Robins School of Business, University of Richmond)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-24&r=gth
Keywords: best-of-three contest, experiments, strategic momentum, psychological momentum
JEL: C72
  • A coalitional procedure leading to a family of bankruptcy rules
Date: 2010-12
By: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mal:wpaper:2010-11&r=gth
We provide a general coalitional procedure that characterizes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems inspired by the Talmud.
Keywords: bankruptcy, coalitions, claims, Talmud
JEL: C71
  • What is the Nature and Social Norm within the Context of In-Group Favouritism?
Date: 2010-12-13
By: Harris, D.
Herrmann, B.
Kontoleon, A.
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1062&r=gth
Keywords: Social Norms, In-group Favouritism, Group Behaviour, In-group Punishment, Out-group Punishment, Third-party Punishment, Experimental Design
JEL: D73
  • Animal Spirits and Informational Externalities in an Endogenous-Timing Investment Game: an Experimental Study
Date: 2010-10
By: Asen Ivanov (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business)
Dan Levin (Department of Economics, The Ohio State University)
James Peck (Department of Economics, The Ohio State University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vcu:wpaper:1004&r=gth
  • Iterating influence between players in a social network
Date: 2010-11
By: Michel Grabisch (CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I, EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris)
Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I, EEP-PSE – Ecole d’Économie de Paris – Paris School of Economics – Ecole d’Économie de Paris)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00543840_v1&r=gth
Keywords: Social network, influence, stochastic influence function, convergence, terminal class, Markov chains, aggregation functions.
  • The Number of Organizations in Heterogeneous Societies
Date: 2010-05-27
By: Lind, Jo Thori (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2010_008&r=gth
Keywords: Organizations; public goods; split up stability; efficiency; endogneous membership
JEL: D71
  • Partial Harmonization of Corporate Taxes in an Asymmetric Repeated Game Setting
Date: 2010-11
By: Itaya, Jun-ichi
Okamura, Makoto
Yamaguchi, Chikara
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hok:dpaper:229&r=gth
Keywords: Tax coordination, Asymmetric countries, Repeated game, Tax competition,
JEL: H73
  • Entropy and the value of information for investors
Date: 2010-12-06
By: Antonio Cabrales (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Olivier Gossner (Paris School of Economics and LSE)
Roberto Serrano (Brown University and IMDEA Social Sciences Institute)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2010-23&r=gth
Keywords: informativeness; information structures; entropy; decision under uncertainty; investment; Blackwell ordering
JEL: C00

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