Théorie des jeux: working papers (RePEc, 9/12/2010)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  • An Incomplete Information Justification of Symmetric Equilibrium in Symmetric Games
Date: 2010-11-22
By: Christoph Kuzmics
Brian W. Rogers
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000332&r=gth
  • A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions
Date: 2010
By: Michel Grabisch (CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I)
Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES – Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne – CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne – Paris I)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00539009_v1&r=gth
Keywords: weighted positive influence index, weighted negative influence index, influence function, follower of a coalition, perfect follower, kernel
  • Who should be called to the lab? A comprehensive comparison of students and non-students in classic experimental games
Date: 2010-10
By: Michèle Belot
Raymond Duch (Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, Nuffield College, University of Oxford)
Luis Miller
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cex:dpaper:2010001&r=gth
Keywords: lab experiments, convenience samples, other-regarding preferences, consistency
JEL: C72
  • A cooperative game-theoretic approach to ALOHA
Date: 2010
By: Marban Sebastian
Ven Peter van de
Borm Peter
Hamers Herbert (METEOR)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2010049&r=gth
Keywords: operations research and management science;
  • Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war
Date: 2010-11-18
By: Clara Ponsati
Santiago Sanchez-Pages
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:esedps:198&r=gth
Keywords: Conflict, Income redistribution, Natives, Immigrants.
JEL: C78
  • When a precedent of donation favors defection in the Prisoner’s dilemma
Date: 2010
By: Garapin, A.
Llerena, D.
Hollard, M.
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:201007&r=gth
Keywords: DONATION;COOPERATION;DEFECTION;REPEATED ONE SHOT PRISONER’S DILEMMA;EXPERIMENT
JEL: C72
  • Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets
Date: 2010-11-22
By: Alexey I. Kushnir
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000351&r=gth
  • Taking the initiative. What motivates leaders?
Date: 2010
By: Lisa Bruttel
Urs Fischbacher
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0061&r=gth
Keywords: leading-by-example, social preferences, experiment
  • A Diamond-Dybvig Model Without Bank Run: the Power of Signaling
Date: 2010-11
By: Kiss, Hubert Janos (Departamento de Análisis Económico (Teoría e Historia Económica). Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uam:wpaper:201006&r=gth
Keywords: bank run; sequential game; signaling; iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies; coordination.
JEL: C72
  • Existence and Testable Implications of Extreme Stable Matchings
Date: 2010-11-22
By: Federico Echenique
SangMok Lee
M. Bumin Yenmez
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000337&r=gth
  • Learning and Experimentation in Strategic Bandit Problems
Date: 2010-11-03
By: Klein, Nicolas
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:dissen:12272&r=gth
  • Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests
Date: 2010-11
By: Tymofiy Mylovanov (Penn State University)
Andriy Zapechelnyuk (Queen Mary, University of London)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp674&r=gth
Keywords: Communication, Information, Noise, Experts, Constant threat
JEL: C72
  • Matching Allocation Problems with Endogenous Information Acquisition
Date: 2010-11
By: Sophie Bade (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_46&r=gth
Keywords: Bubbles, Rational Expectations, Bonuses, Compensation Schemes, Financial Crises, Financial Policy
JEL: C78

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