[GTH] Théorie des jeux: working papers (RePEc, 16/08/2010)

Source : NEP (New Economics Papers) | RePEc

  • Trust with Private and Common Property: Effects of Stronger Property Right Entitlements
Date: 2010-08
By: James C. Cox
Daniel T. Hall
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exc:wpaper:2010-07&r=gth
Is mutually beneficial cooperation in trust games more prevalent with private property or common property? Does the strength of property right entitlement affect the answer? Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. [1] report little difference between cooperation in private and common property trust games. We assign stronger property right entitlements by requiring subjects to meet a performance quota in a real effort task to earn their endowments. We find that cooperation is lower in common property trust games than in private property trust games, which is an idiosyncratic prediction of revealed altruism theory [2].
  • Social Norms, Information and Trust Among Strangers: Theory and Evidence
Date: 2010-08
By: John Duffy
Huan Xie
Yong-Ju Lee
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:399&r=gth
Can a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerge among strangers? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects play a series of indefinitely repeated trust games. Players are randomly and anonymously matched each period. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (anonymous community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and whether that information must be provided freely or at some cost. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information.
JEL: C72
  • Structural modeling of altruistic giving
Date: 2010-08-05
By: Breitmoser, Yves
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:24262&r=gth
The paper analyzes econometric models of altruistic giving in dictator and public goods games. Using existing data sets, I evaluate internal and external validity of « atheoretic » regression models as well as structural models of random behavior, random coefficients, and random utility, controlling for subject heterogeneity by finite mixture modeling. In dictator games, atheoretic regression lacks external validity, while random coefficient models and random utility models offer high degrees of both internal and external validity. In public goods games, regression works comparably well, being bettered only by random utility models. Overall, the ordered GEV model of random utility is most appropriate to describe choices in the considered games.
Keywords: structural modeling; altruism; dictator game; public goods; ordered choice sets
JEL: C50
  • Hypothetical and convenience sample biases in value orientations ring games
Date: 2010-08
By: Emmanouil Mentzakis
Stuart Mestelman
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2010-06&r=gth
The social value orientations ring game is often used to identify behavioural types and provide insight regarding choices made by individuals in market or non-market environments. However, research on the impact of providing salient rewards to individuals making choices in the ring game is sparse. As well, the comparison of student and non-student samples with regard to social value orientations is limited. Following literature from other experimental fields, this paper is concerned with the presence of hypothetical bias (i.e. difference between subject behaviour when rewards are not salient (stated intentions) and actual subject behaviour when rewards are salient) and convenience sample bias (i.e. difference in findings of students versus non-student community subjects) in the social value orientation ring game. Looking at the social value orientation measures and their consistency, we find no evidence of hypothetical bi as but significant differences when comparing student and community samples. Our findings suggest caution in generalizing value orientation results across different populations while they support the collection of value orientations at lower cost without compromising the consistency of the results.
Keywords: value orientations; hypothetical bias; convenience sample bias
JEL: C91

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